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Human rights and public education 
Abstract  
This chapter attempts a contrast to the contribution by Hugh Starkey. Rather than his account 
of the inexorable rise of human rights discourse, and of the implementation of human rights 
standards, human rights are here presented as always and necessarily scandalous and highly 
contested. First, I explain why the UK has lagged so far behind its European neighbours in 
implementing citizenship education. Second, a comparison with France shows that the latest 
UK reforms bring us up to 1789. Third, the 20th century second generation social and 
economic rights are still anathema in the UK. Fourth, the failure to come to terms with 
Empire and especially the slave trade means that the UK’s attitude to third generation rights, 
especially the right of peoples to self-determination, is heavily compromised. Taking into 
account the points I raise, citizenship education in the UK might look very different. 
Keywords 
human rights, citizenship, generations of rights, comparison France and Britain, institutional 
racism, empire 
Introduction 
This article, based on a keynote address to the conference which gave rise to this collection, 
attempts a contrast to the contribution by Hugh Starkey. Rather than his unproblematised 
account of the inexorable rise of human rights discourse, and of the implementation of human 
rights standards, human rights are here presented as always and necessarily scandalous and 
highly contested.  
In this article, I firstly outline, with the help of Upendra Baxi, the approach of the UN and 
Council of Europe to human rights education;  and outline my own credentials to reflect on 
these topics. Next, I explain why the UK has lagged so far behind its European neighbours in 
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implementing citizenship education, which is where, for the UK, human rights education is to 
be found. The recent publication, Right Here Right Now: Teaching Citizenship Through 
Human Rights (Ministry of Justice et al,(MoJ) 2008), produced in order to teach the new Key 
Stage 3 Citizenship curriculum, although attractive and highly professional, highlights these 
underlying problems with the UK approach. Third, a comparison with France shows, to the 
UK’s disadvantage,  that the latest UK reforms bring us up to 1789. Fourth, the 20th century 
second generation social and economic rights are still anathema in the UK, which has 
established itself in the avant-guard of neo-liberalism. Fifth, the failure to come to terms with 
Empire and especially the slave trade means that the UK’s attitude to third generation rights, 
especially the right of peoples to self-determination, is heavily compromised. Human rights 
are shown to arise out of concrete revolutionary events, moving from Europe to the 
decolonising post-WWII world, as substantive bearers of symbolic capital, reawakened on 
each new occasion of struggle. Taking into account the points I raise, citizenship education in 
the UK might look very different. 
My credentials for writing this chapter 
In contrast to the other contributors to this volume, I am not a specialist in the theory of 
education, or in cultural studies.  I am a teacher of law to undergraduates and postgraduates, 
and also, as an advocate, a human rights practitioner. In the 1990s I represented many Kurds 
at the European Court of Human Rights, and since 2000 have taken a large number of 
Chechen and other cases to Strasbourg. In 2003 I created, with a large grant from the 
European Commission, the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, which now employs 
12 lawyers in Russia including Chechnya, and has an office in London with five staff. We 
have assisted several hundred applicants, and helped win in 2005 the first Chechen cases 
arising from the Second Chechen War which started in 1999, and the first environmental case 
against Russia. I am also active with UK focused NGOs such as Liberty. 
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But I do have some further experience in and of education. My first teaching job, in the early 
1970s, immediately after graduating with a degree in philosophy, was as a lecturer in general 
studies at a technical college in Kent, to engineering apprentices – a baptism of fire, but also 
a constant discovery of talents which had had no chance of expression in the secondary 
modern system. I first paid serious attention to the European Convention on Human Rights in 
1986, when with colleagues I was prosecuted by Margaret Thatcher for “wilful misconduct” 
as a Lambeth Borough Councillor resisting the cuts she imposed – nothing like as savage as 
those now proposed by the coalition government. My first experience of the power and 
actuality of human rights was as a member of a delegation to the Palestinian Occupied 
Territories in 1988.  I started teaching human rights to undergraduates in 1992 at the 
University of East London, and helped to develop the Bar Human Rights Committee’s 
schools project, sending barristers to speak at schools throughout the country. I regularly 
make presentations on human rights to school students, most recently to sixth formers in 
London and Essex – and to a splendidly well-informed and inquisitive group of 8-11 year 
olds in a “disadvantaged” primary school. And from 1998 to 2002, in close cooperation with 
the Citizenship Foundation, I helped to establish a centre for the teaching of human rights and 
citizenship in Kazakhstan, with the publication of three textbooks for secondary school 
students. 
Developments on international standards 
In 1994 my colleague Upendra Baxi gave (Baxi, 1994) a splendid tour d’horizon of the 
United Nations biography of human rights education (HRE). He reminds us (1994, 4) that the 
words of the Preamble to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights stress the central 
importance of a ‘common understanding’ of human rights and fundamental freedoms to the 
achievement of ‘freedom, justice and peace in the world’, and that the operative part 
proclaims that a ‘common standard of achievement’ of these values, nationally and globally, 
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requires ‘that every individual and organ of society, keeping this Declaration in mind, shall 
try by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms…’. 
Baxi emphasises that ‘education’ in human rights ‘is thus the individual and collective duty 
of all, nationally, regionally and globally.’ (p.4) He adds that education has a global 
orientation of producing true citizens of the world, ‘imbued with civic virtues of respect for 
pluralism, peace, dignity and rights. (p.5) 
The UNESCO Recommendation concerning education for international understanding, co-
operation and peace and education relating to human rights and fundamental freedom of 19 
November 1974 (UNESCO 1974, known as the Recommendation Concerning Human Rights 
Education), as Baxi notes, significantly enlarged notions of ‘education’ for the purpose of 
HRE. Article 1(a) states that ‘The word education implies the entire process of social life by 
means of which individuals and social groups learn to develop consciously within, and for the 
benefit of, the national and international communities, the whole of their personal capacities, 
attitudes, aptitudes and knowledge.’ The aims of HRE are expanded to include ‘solidarity 
with less privileged groups’ so as to result in ‘observance of principles of equality in 
everyday life’ (Article 5); and creating capabilities to eradicate ‘conditions which perpetuate 
major problems affecting human survival and well-being’ (Article18).   Baxi is right to say 
that the Recommendation thus pursues ‘radical egalitarianism in everyday life’ (p.8). This is 
something which, as will be shown, is lacking in the UK to this day. 
UNESCO’s International Congress on Education for Human Rights and Democracy held in 
Montreal in March 1993 gave birth to the World Plan of Action for Education on Human 
Rights and Democracy (UNESCO 1993), which laid a key foundation for the Vienna 
Declaration and Programme of Action  adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights 
on 25 June 1993, and the United Nations Decade for Human Rights Education (1995-2004), 
with its Plan of Action, submitted on 12 December 1996 (United Nations 1994).  
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The General Guiding Principles included education for ‘civil, cultural, economic, political 
and social rights and recognizing the indivisibility and interdependence of all rights…’ 
(para.4), and ‘human rights education under the Decade shall seek to further effective 
democratic participation in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, and shall be 
utilized as a means of promoting economic and social progress and people-centred 
sustainable development.’ (para.7) 
Finally, on 11 May 2010, the Council of Europe adopted the Recommendation on the Charter 
on Education for Democratic Citizenship and Human Rights Education (CM/Rec(2010)7), 
following Recommendation Rec (2002)12 of the Committee of Ministers of 16 October 2002 
to member states on education for democratic citizenship. Education for democratic 
citizenship was defined as:  ‘…education, training, awareness-raising, information, practices 
and activities which aim, by equipping learners with knowledge, skills and understanding and 
developing their attitudes and behaviour, to empower them to exercise and defend their 
democratic rights and responsibilities in society, to value diversity and to play an active part 
in democratic life, with a view to the promotion and protection of democracy and the rule of 
law.’ On 17-19 November 2010 the network of EDC/HRE coordinators met in Norway. The 
UK would have been represented by David Kerr, but he gave his apologies. But a 
questionnaire was approved to be sent to member states on teaching the ECHR case law: 
‘Learning the key principles and the functioning of the human rights protection system’. 
I note that my colleague Dina Kiwan (2005) has questioned the foundation of this approach 
to the teaching of citizenship within a human rights framework. She asks boldly whether 
human rights, located within a universalist frame of reference, are not conceptually distinct 
from citizenship, which are located within a more particularist frame. She poses the question 
whether conflating human rights with citizenship may actually obstruct the empowerment 
and active participation of individual citizens. That is a valid and politically challenging 
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criticism. But she does not reflect on the developments in terms of documents at the UN and 
Council of Europe level, and it would be interesting to see her critique of them in the light of 
her approach.   
It remains to be seen how the UK will respond to the challenge posed by the new Charter. In 
their ‘synthesis of scholarly literature’ on EDC in England during 1995-2005 (Osler & 
Starkey 2006), that is, during the UN Decade referred to above, Audrey Osler and Hugh 
Starkey mention the Charter (2006, 434), but do not analyse its provisions; however, they do 
recognise that ‘The struggle for political justice and equality continues to the present day.’ 
(2006, 438). The US scholar James Banks (2008) argues for ‘transformative citizenship 
education’, which would enable students to ‘acquire the information, skills and values needed 
to challenge inequality within their communities, their nations, and the world… to take 
thoughtful individual or collective civic action.’ (Banks 1998, 135). Those are themes I 
pursue in this paper.   
Right Here Right Now? What is going on in the UK? 
The recent publication Right Here Right Now (Ministry of Justice et al ,(MoJ)  2008) 
produced by a uniquely powerful team of two government ministries and two leading UK 
NGOs, to assist teachers to teach the National Curriculum, although very professionally and 
attractively produced, highlights the underlying problems with the UK approach. It is a 
resource designed to support the delivery of the revised KS3 Citizenship curriculum taught 
from September 2008.  
As the Introduction points out, the new curriculum is underpinned by three key concepts:  
Democracy and Justice;  Rights and Responsibilities; and Identities and Diversity: living 
together in the UK. 
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In this document, human rights are presented in a standard formulation, as timeless, as always 
already in existence. ‘Human rights are the basic rights we all have simply because we are 
human; they are the fundamental things that human beings need in order to flourish and 
participate fully in society. Human rights belong to everyone, regardless of their 
circumstances.’ (MoJ, 7) 
Further, on the same page: ‘The ideas behind human rights have been present throughout 
history in many different societies and civilisations.’  The “modern concept of human rights” 
is presented as having ‘emerged’ following the events of the Second World War, in particular 
the Holocaust; and the array of international, regional and domestic human rights instruments 
and mechanisms as having been ‘prompted and inspired’, and having followed seamlessly 
from the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  This account is altogether abstract 
and static, despite the reference to the Second World War, and gives no indication that human 
rights have ever been associated with struggle, still less with revolution.  
The detailed ‘human rights timeline’ (MoJ, 35) tells teachers and their students that in 1215 
the Magna Carta was ‘issued’, rather than having been wrung out of the King by the barons; 
that in 1689 Parliament ‘agreed’ the Bill of Rights, rather than imposing it on the newly 
invited King, having deposed his predecessor, and having executed that predecessor’s father 
following a civil war; that in 1789 the French National Assembly ‘agreed’ the Declaration of 
Rights of Man and of the Citizen, rather than making this astounding statement in 
circumstances where they fully expected to be executed for their actions in overthrowing the 
French monarchy; and that in 1791 the US Congress ‘agreed’ the Bill of Rights, rather than 
cementing the revolutionary overthrow of British rule. Thomas Paine (2008), author of 
Common Sense (1776) and The Rights of Man (1791), of course gets no mention.    
No explanation is given either as to why the UK, having signed the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in 1951 – and as is pointed out UK lawyers were instrumental in the 
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drafting process – did not make the Convention available in UK domestic courts until 2 
October 2000, when the Human Rights Act 1998 came into force. I return to an explanation 
below. 
This sets the stage for ‘Human Rights Education’ in England. The document highlights and 
promotes (MoJ, 15) the ‘whole-school approach’, as follows: ‘Over the last few years, 
ground-breaking research in Canada and the UK has demonstrated the benefits of a whole-
school approach to human rights education… Here in the UK, Hampshire County Council is 
conducting a project called ‘Rights, Respect and Responsibility’ which encourages schools to 
embed a human rights approach across the curriculum and into the whole-school ethos.” This 
is known as the “RRR initiative’. 
The document notes that the Hampshire project was inspired by a similar project in Cape 
Breton, Canada.   However, Brian Howe and Katherine Covell, of Cape Breton University in 
Canada (Howe & Covell, 2010) carried out a three year study, completed in 2008, the year of 
publication of Right Here Right Now, of the impact and implementation of the project, 
interviewing and surveying head teachers, teachers and students in 18 schools involved in the 
RRR initiative. Thirteen of these schools completed their study and gave them their data set. 
(Ibid, 96) They compared schools where RRR was fully implemented (FI), and schools where 
it was partially implemented (PI). While they found ‘overall success’ in the RRR programme, 
they also observed, especially in PI schools, some ‘miseducation’.  
They note (Ibid, 98) that, according to Osler and Starkey (2005), the title ‘Rights, Respect 
and Responsibility’ was chosen as a means of ‘depoliticising claims about rights’, by linking 
rights directly with responsibilities (a favourite trope of UK politicians) with the result that 
some head teachers decided that children should be taught responsibilities before they learn 
that they have rights, or to give emphasis to responsibilities at the expense of rights. They 
found (Ibid, 99) that children in such schools had little knowledge of the nature of rights, and 
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a majority could not describe what rights were. Thus, ‘… the focus on responsibilities may 
compromise children’s capacity to understand rights in ways that reflect a serious 
miseducation on children’s rights.’ 
This paper goes further, to suggest that the characteristically English take on rights, 
exemplified in Right Here Right Now and the RRR project, is rooted in characteristically 
British attitudes to human rights.         
The UK’s long road to citizenship and human rights education 
In 2003 David Kerr wrote that there is ‘no great tradition of explicit teaching of human rights 
in the UK.’ Indeed, in his 1999 comparison of 16 countries, Kerr observed that only the UK 
lacked citizenship education in any form, let alone human rights education. Citizenship 
education, including human rights, was finally introduced into the secondary school 
curriculum in September 2002, following the Crick Report in 1998, for Key Stage 3 (11-14 
years old) and Key Stage 4 (14-16).  Kerr also noted (1999) that ‘(T)he avoidance of any 
overt official government direction to schools concerning political socialization and 
citizenship education can almost be seen as a national trait.’ As Terence McLoughlin (2000) 
pointed out, in contrast to many other countries, England and Britain as a whole were very 
slow. This in his view is linked to the obvious fact that the inhabitants of Britain have long 
been ‘subjects’ rather than ‘citizens’, also noted by Crick (1999, 4): ‘… a subject obeys the 
laws and a citizen plays a part in making and changing them.’  
For Crick, the desirable outcome of citizenship education, implicit in his Report, is ‘civic 
republicanism’, a democratic society in which ‘… the public have… rights to be involved in 
the things that are of common concern… and cannot merely exercise those rights but are 
presumed to have a civic duty to do so.’ (Crick 1999, 5). This was in strong contrast to the 
active citizen of Thatcherism who, as Faulks (2006, 125) points out, ‘was a law abiding, 
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materially successful individual who was willing and able to exploit the opportunities created 
by the promotion of market rights, while demonstrating occasional compassion for those less 
fortunate than themselves – charity rather than democratic citizenship was to be the main 
instrument of “active citizenship”.’ Audrey Osler and Hugh Starkey situate the impetus for 
the Crick Report in the constitutional reforms of the first years of the Labour Government 
elected in 1997, namely the Human Rights Act 1998, and devolution for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland (Osler & Starkey 2001, 335). 
Yet the distinctive model of citizenship promoted by New Labour and developed by Crick 
has a direct impact on who may become a British citizen. Dina Kiwan (2008) describes a 
‘journey’ to citizenship in the UK, in the context of the ‘citizenship tests’ introduced as a 
requirement for naturalisation following a report published in 2003, in which she participated. 
She argues (Ibid, 71), against those for whom rights should be framed ‘in terms of human 
rights based on international law’ – Kiwan adds the word ‘responsibilities’ to ‘rights’, and 
against those for whom the source of human rights is the ‘individual’s moral nature’, here 
human rights are a consequence of  ‘the inherent dignity of the human person’, that ‘when 
talking of citizen’s rights and responsibilities, these rights are based on membership of a 
political community, rather than solely in terms of membership of the human species’ (as 
explained by her in Kiwan 2005). For her, members of a political community are those who 
have formal citizenship status – for naturalisation, having passed the test which she helped to 
create. Surely it should be added that members of a political community are those who take 
an active part in struggling to sustain and improve it.  
As I seek to explain in this paper, my own take on human rights departs from all three 
conceptions described by Kiwan. I do not find human rights empirically in the plethora of 
human rights instruments and their ratification by the majority of states, as does Donnelly; 
nor do I find them in human nature; nor simply in the fact of citizenship. Instead, I 
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understand human rights as the highly contested products of great historical upheavals, social 
capital identified in the instruments, and brought back to life constantly in the context of real 
struggles (Xxxx 2008a).    
France – in comparison  
In Audrey Osler and Hugh Starkey in their illuminating study (2009) show that both Britain 
and France introduced new programmes of citizenship education in about 1999.These were 
both in part responses to the challenge of racism and xenophobia, in Britain crystallised in the 
1999 Macpherson report into the murder of Stephen Lawrence, which for the first time 
identified ‘institutional racism’.  
The French reforms started with guidelines and a program of study developed from 1996 by a 
working party, the Groupe Technique Disciplinaire, Éducation Civique (Ibid, 335). However, 
Osler and Starkey point out that, in strong contrast to Britain, France introduced citizenship 
education as far back as 1871, when democratic rule was restored after the disaster of the 
Franco-Prussian War. It has been ‘intended to help integrate a diverse population into a single 
national French culture defined as Republican.’ That is, it is based on the principles of liberté, 
egalité, fraternité (freedom, equality, solidarity) which are inscribed on every public building 
in France, and on droits de l’homme (human rights), which, as already noted, date from the 
Declaration of 1789, and remain an integral part of the French Constitution.  
Osler and Starkey find (Ibid, 340) that ‘(T)he emphasis on human rights is considerably more 
developed in the French program than in the English. A very influential report (the Audigier 
report)… in 1984 and a subsequent action research program ensured that the case for human 
rights as the fundamental principles underpinning education is accepted by all major political 
parties.’ The French program places much more emphasis on community and local 
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democracy, and the work of political parties, trade unions, and pressure groups is presented 
as healthy elements in a democracy.  
Most strikingly: 
‘The emphasis… is of citizens actively engaged in the French Republic’s central task 
of promoting justice. The book’s cover shows young people involved in a 
demonstration, and there are a further nine photographs of demonstrations and strikes, 
all presented positively. Active citizenship is linked explicitly to demonstrations, 
political party membership, and participating in strike action. Striking is described as 
“one of the great social achievements of workers, it is recognised by the 
Constitution.”’ (Osler & Starkey 2009, 343). 
The contrast with Britain could not be stronger. In the view of the present author, Margaret 
Thatcher’s onslaught on local democracy and on trade unions in the 1980s, both of which she 
swore she would deal with as soon as she was elected in 1979, have fundamentally changed 
the social context  in the UK. It is noted that in this she followed in the footsteps of the great 
English constitutional lawyer, A. V. Dicey, (Dicey, 1914), for whom local government and 
trade unions posed the gravest threats to parliamentary sovereignty and to English freedoms. 
In France, the natural reaction to injustice is to take to the streets, and to go on strike, and all 
French children have learned that this is proper and appropriate behaviour. In France a 
demonstration will take up the whole street; in Britain, demonstrators are usually tightly 
corralled and directed. The enormous demonstrations against the Iraq War, and the Trade 
Union Congress demonstration of 26 March 2011 have been exceptions. In France, country-
wide strikes are commonplace; in Britain, it is increasingly difficult to organise a lawful 
strike at all. Yet the right to demonstrate peacefully and the right to strike are fundamental 
human rights protected by the international and regional instruments. Except in Britain. Osler 
and Starkey (2009, 344) suggest that ‘Teachers in England are amazed to hear that French 
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textbooks emphasise the right to strike, and it is difficult to imagine that such a textbook 
would be well received by British parents.’   
They conclude that ‘while the French program is based on Republican values, particularly 
human rights… [T]he programme for England emphasises social and moral responsibility… 
[I]t is therefore more pragmatic and less concerned with core principles.’ That is, in view of 
the foregoing, to put the differences rather mildly.      
But the most significant difference between England and France is - 1789. The document 
containing the civil and political rights, which, on my account given below constituted the 
first generation of human rights, was the child of the French Revolution, drafted and 
proclaimed by revolutionaries who expected it to be their monument in the event of their 
likely imminent execution.  The ECHR, drafted as we know primarily by British lawyers, 
reproduces almost verbatim the rights contained in the French Declaration of Rights of Man 
and of the Citizen. My point at this stage is, therefore, that the UK’s Human Rights Act of 
1998 and the 2002 Citizenship curriculum together have the effect of bringing the UK from 
(or perhaps within) feudalism right up to 1789. But not quite to the present day. That is, the 
“second generation”, social and economic rights, and the third generation, of rights of 
peoples, starting with the right of peoples to self-determination, are missing.  
I should explain at this point that the notion of three generations of rights was first proposed 
by Karel Vasak (Vasak 1977), legal adviser to UNESCO at the time of the heated 
international debates concerning a Right to Development. This not a universally accepted 
framework, although I find it pedagogically useful as an overview. Alston and others (2001) 
have suggested that the so-called 'third-generation' of  'rights of peoples', the rights to self-
determination, to development, to a clean environment, to peace - were an effusion of 
Seventies radicalism and have had their day. 
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It is of course the case, as Osler and Starkey point out (2009, 345), that Britain, in contrast to 
France, ‘acknowledges religious diversity, and has increased the power and status of religious 
groups and authorities in schooling’ (I would myself question whether this last is at all to be 
commended); and ‘recognises a range of ethnic groups and expects understanding of diversity 
(and) expects individuals to challenge prejudice and discrimination, but does not consider 
collective responses or the existence of institutional racism and structural disadvantage.’ 
France, as a ‘revolutionary Republican’ state seeks to protect secularism in education, and 
resolutely refuses to recognise the existence of ethnic groups. President Sarkozy’s policy of 
deporting Roma families to Romania in the summer of 2010 showed France in the worst 
possible light.  
The scandal of human rights 
The rights contained in the French Declaration of 1789 were anathema to many contemporary 
commentators, especially those from the British Isles. In his splendid collection Nonsense 
Upon Stilts (1987) Jeremy Waldron shows how Edmund Burke, Jeremy Bentham and Karl 
Marx all attacked the rights set out in the French Declaration, albeit from their conservative, 
liberal and communist standpoints. For Burke, the Irish-born intellectual father of English 
conservatism, the list of rights in the Declaration were utterly corrosive of traditional, 
organically developed liberties. They were an underground explosive mine which would 
destroy all established institutions. For Bentham, the founder of the political philosophy of 
utilitarianism, human rights were ‘anarchical fallacies’, simply ‘nonsense upon stilts’.  
It is my case (Xxxx 2008, 2008a) that each of the three “generations” of human rights came 
into existence not as documents ‘agreed’ by some legislative body or benign administration, 
but as the products of revolutionary events, posing discomfort and fear to the entrenched 
authorities. Thus, just as the civil and political rights were the progeny of the French and 
American revolutions, so the second generation of social and economic rights became legally 
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protected human rights as a direct result of the Russian Revolution of 1917. Social and 
economic rights had pride of place in all three Soviet Constitutions (1924, 1936 and 1977), 
and it can truthfully be said that the right to work, the right to free health care and to quality 
free primary, secondary and tertiary education, as well as to social security and pensions, 
were to a large extent implemented until the USSR’s collapse in 1991. The response of the 
West to the existential threat posed by recognition of these rights was the creation in 1919 of 
the International Labour Organisation as an agency of the League of Nations and now of the 
United Nations. Its many binding treaties, and its unique trilateral procedures, bringing 
together governments, business and trade unions, have made social and economic rights, the 
second generation, a reality – except in the UK. Finally, the third generation of human rights 
was spearheaded by the right of peoples to self-determination. The recognition of this right as 
a fundamental right by virtue of its inclusion in Article 1 of both the UN’s human rights 
covenants of 1966, on civil and political rights (ICCPR), and economic, social and cultural 
rights (ICESCR) respectively, was the achievement of the colonial peoples fighting for their 
independence. 
The absence of rights in UK constitutional theory and state practice 
This is the point at which to return to the UK. 
The key text to this day in understanding the UK’s constitutional system – in the absence of a 
written constitution – remains A V Dicey’s classic Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution (Dicey 1885). Dicey not only provided definitions of the rule of law and of the 
central principle of the English system, the supremacy or sovereignty of parliament, but 
provided lucid and compelling arguments as to why Britain’s slow and haphazard provision 
of protection for key civil liberties, dependent on individual cases reaching the courts, was far 
superior to protection of rights through declarations and lists in written constitutions, as in 
France and Belgium. By the way, Dicey was also a strenuous opponent of Home Rule for 
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Ireland – Parliament’s sovereignty had to extend to the whole of the British Isles (Mount 
1993). 
In contrast to most contemporary textbooks of English constitutional law, which rarely 
contain comparative references except as to the US constitutional system, Dicey’s key text is 
a genuinely comparative work. In the view of Dicey and his successors, adoption of a list of 
rights, however described, would pose immense danger to ‘English freedom’. 
That is one reason for the delay, from 1951 to 1988, in incorporating the ECHR into English 
domestic law, let alone citizenship education.  
The UK also to this day refuses to recognise the binding force of social and economic rights – 
the ‘second generation’ - as enshrined in the UN Covenant of 1966 referred to above, and the 
Council of Europe’s 1989 Revised Social Charter. The UK has ratified the ICESCR, but will 
not so far ratify its Optional Protocol, which would enable complaints to the UN for failure to 
comply. Under the Revised Social Charter, there is a right of collective complaint, by trade 
unions, NGOs and similar, to the European Social Committee, which can adjudicate and has 
done so in a series of decisions on child labour, trade union rights, and other social rights 
against Council of Europe member states. The UK is the state with the most extreme social 
stratification, the most restrictive trade union laws, and the highest incarceration rates of any 
Western European country. 
I therefore disagree with Hugh Starkey when he says that the European Convention on 
Human Rights (and the Human Rights Act) are based on the UN’s 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. This is not the case. The ECHR contains no social and 
economic rights, with the exception of the curiously phrased right to education in Article 2 of 
Protocol 1. The UDHR protects social and economic as well as civil and political rights. As I 
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have already pointed out, the ECHR and the Human Rights Act therefore go no further than 
1789.  
Another reason for the long delay in incorporating the ECHR 
And despite active involvement in drafting the ECHR, the UK did not want to accept the 
right of individual petition until 1966. We have still not enshrined the right to complain to the 
Human Rights Committee of the UN under the ICCPR. 
Why not? 
The main reason for this hesitation and delay is the British Empire. Osler (2009) points out 
that the Empire and its consequences are completely missing from the discourse of Blair and 
Brown on citizenship. I emphasise, as above, that the establishment of the ‘third generation’ 
of human rights, which came to be recognised in international law after 1966, was driven by 
the struggle for decolonisation. 
It is no coincidence that the first cases against the UK after 1966 concerned Cyprus (the inter-
state cases brought by Greece in 1956-7 concerning Britain’s actions in suppressing the 
EOKA movement), the notorious case of the East African Asians, in which Britain was 
condemned in 1973 for the suffering caused by its discriminatory policies, and Northern 
Ireland (the inter-state case brought by the Republic of Ireland alleging that the UK had 
employed torture against Republic suspects in detention; the UK was convicted of inhuman 
and degrading treatment in 1978). Britain, as a colonial power until rather recently, had every 
reason to delay as long as possible, in fact for 13 years until 1966, the right of complaint 
against it to the Strasbourg Court. Soon there will be important judgments in the European 
Court of Human Rights (Al-Skeini v UK, and Al-Jedda v UK) concerning the actions of 
Britain’s armed forces in the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. 
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I already mentioned MacPherson’s discovery of institutional racism in 1999. But the UK is 
still in denial. My colleague at Essex University, Fernne Brennan, ensures that the issue of 
reparations for the slave trade is not forgotten. And in a further post-colonial twist, the highly 
varied Muslim communities of the UK have now been constructed, by way of legislation and 
government pronouncements, as a ‘suspect community’, exactly the fate which befell the 
Irish in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, I emphasise two further points of disagreement with Hugh Starkey. 
First, human rights discourse works as ‘emotional rhetoric’, as he puts it, because, and only 
because, on each occasion that it is evoked by people in struggle, individuals and groups, it 
re-awakens the symbolic capital of the revolutionary events which gave birth to each of the 
three generations of rights I have mentioned. That is, when the Kurds or the Chechens take 
their cases to the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey and Russia, complaining 
of violations of the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, they bring back to life 
the revolutionary content of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 
1789; and at the same time they draw strength and legitimacy from the Right of Peoples to 
Self-Determination, which became a legally binding right in international law, enshrined in 
UN Treaties and Resolutions, through the post-WW II anti-colonial struggles. 
Second, for Starkey, a right is not a right unless you know about it. That is perfectly true as 
far as it goes, and it is our duty as human rights educators to ensure that our pupils and 
students are as well-informed as possible. But history has shown on very many occasions that 
is not a right, on the contrary it is mere rhetorical froth, unless you fight for it. Human rights 
were born, and come back to life again and again, through an unending struggle against 
oppression, exploitation, inequality and discrimination. 
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How does the committed teacher put such principles into the practice of pedagogy? A start 
could be made by demonstrating the contradiction between human rights as they have 
emerged and crystallised over the course of three centuries, and 
 the corrosive application of market values to spheres of life, such as public health and 
education, in which it is hard to see how they have a place 
 the corollary of glorification of the market, namely the commodification of everything 
including human values, culture and simple collective life in society 
 the extreme gulf between rich and poor of the kind now to be found in the UK 
 the plague of ASBOs, indeterminate sentences, imprisonment for minor offences, and 
the punitive philosophy which lies behind them 
 the poisonous left-overs of Empire, including racism, xenophobia and racist 
discrimination  
Those are just a few of the glaring problems of contemporary life, with which any serious 
education in citizenship and human rights must necessarily engage. 
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